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Cognitive deﬁcits are core to the disability associated with many psychiatric disorders. Both variation in cognition
and psychiatric risk show substantial heritability, with overlapping genetic variants contributing to both.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, these ﬁelds have been mutually beneﬁcial : just as cognitive studies of psychiatric risk
variants may identify genes involved in cognition, so too can genome-wide studies based on cognitive phenotypes
lead to genes relevant to psychiatric aetiology. The purpose of this review is to consider the main issues involved in
the phenotypic characterization of cognition, and to describe the challenges associated with the transition to genome-
wide approaches. We conclude by describing the approaches currently being taken by the international consortia
involving many investigators in the ﬁeld internationally (e.g. Cognitive Genomics Consortium; COGENT) to
overcome these challenges.
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Introduction
Progress in understanding the genetic architecture of
cognition has derived in no small part from the use of
cognition as an intermediate phenotype for psychi-
atric illness. Research groups working in the areas of
Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, autism, attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), intellectual
disability and other childhood neurodevelopmental
disorders have amassed considerable experience
in characterizing the eﬀects of ‘candidate ’ neuro-
psychiatric risk genes at the level of cognition. Interest
in cognitive deﬁcits in neuropsychiatric genetic stu-
dies has been fuelled by evidence that these deﬁcits
are predictive of psychiatric morbidity (Green et al.
2004), more stable (trait-like), and more easily quanti-
ﬁable than behaviourally deﬁned clinical symptoms
(Erlenmeyer-Kimling et al. 2000). Recently, this work
has resulted in large-scale collaborations to achieve the
sample sizes required for adequately powered gen-
ome-wide studies of cognition. The challenges for this
work are considerable, requiring careful calibration
not just of genetic platforms and analysis, but also of
cognitive phenotypes across samples. Here we review
the main issues involved in combining large datasets
that quantify cognitive performance using overlap-
ping but non-identical metrics.
In outlining the considerations for characterizing
cognition for the purposes of genetic studies, four
methodological issues appear to us to be particularly
noteworthy. The ﬁrst is regarding how best to model
the relationship between diﬀerent aspects of cognition.
The second is to determine criteria for selecting indi-
vidual aspects of cognition to focus on. The third
concerns the type of analysis undertaken, whether
univariate or multivariate. A fourth consideration is
the relative sensitivity of behavioural versus imaging-
based measures of cognition; this issued has been
reviewed extensively elsewhere and will not be ad-
dressed here (Rose & Donohoe, 2012). We conclude by
considering the main concerns involved in studies of
‘neurocognitive phenomics ’ – genome-wide studies
to understand variation in cognition – the studies
published to date, and the approach adopted by
the Cognitive Genomics Consortium (COGENT) in
addressing these issues.
The hierarchy of cognitive functions
Why are some people better than others at perform-
ing particular cognitive tasks, such as arithmetical
* Address for correspondence : G. Donohoe, DClinPsych, Ph.D.,
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, Trinity College Dublin,
Dublin, Republic of Ireland.
(Email : donoghug@tcd.ie)
Psychological Medicine (2013), 43, 2027–2036. f Cambridge University Press 2012
doi:10.1017/S0033291712002656
REVIEW ARTICLE
operations? Several possibilities present themselves to
us. It might be that some people are just better than
others generally in doing cognitive tasks. It might be
that some people are better than others at mental work
that involves numbers and their manipulation and
also other related tasks. It might be that some people
are just better than others at doing a particular arith-
metical task. Of course, there could be other factors
that operate on a particular occasion to produce a
good, medium or bad score. The answer is that all of
these suggestions are correct : there are demonstrable
diﬀerences between people in overall cognitive ability,
in separable domains of cognitive ability, and in spe-
ciﬁc cognitive tasks. There are also occasion-speciﬁc
factors aﬀecting mental performance and error of
measurement.
When we try to model variance in cognitive tasks –
including genetic contributions to the variance – we
need to consider the fact that human cognitive vari-
ance occurs at these diﬀerent levels in a hierarchy. At
the highest level of the hierarchy, which covers the
most general cognitive variation, is what is known as
general cognitive ability. It is also sometimes known as
general intelligence or just ‘g ’. This was discovered by
Spearman (1904) using data from English school-
children. Spearman found that there was a tendency
for all cognitive tasks to show positive correlations. He
hypothesized that people were better at some tasks
than others because they were more or less endowed
with general cognitive ability and also speciﬁc abilities
for each particular task. It was realized that this ex-
planation, although accurate, was insuﬃcient. That is
because it was empirically demonstrated that some
types of tasks correlate more strongly within a par-
ticular type of cognitive domain (e.g. spatial or verbal)
than with tasks outside of that domain. Therefore, an
accommodation was made such that variation in cog-
nitive performance was describable at three levels : at
general cognitive ability, at the level of broad cognitive
domains, and at the level of speciﬁc skills. Probably
the ﬁrst person to describe this hierarchy clearly was
Vernon (1940).
The best evidence for the hierarchy of cognitive
function variation came from Carroll (1993). In this
book, he carried out a massive empirical task by re-
analysing over 400 datasets from many laboratories
that contained a range of mental tasks applied to large
samples. These had been gathered over much of the
20th century. Carroll found that all of these datasets
conformed to a correlational structure that was best
described in a three-level hierarchy. That is, he con-
ﬁrmed Vernon’s suggestion that, to understand the
correlations among mental tests, people’s performance
(variance) was best described as a three-level hier-
archy with general cognitive ability at the peak, major
cognitive domains at the next level, and speciﬁc cog-
nitive abilities at the bottom. The g factor at the peak of
the hierarchy tended to account for between 40% and
50% of the total variance in mental test performance.
The three-level hierarchy has further implications. It
is important to appreciate that the cognitive domains
at the second level are very highly loaded on g (Deary
et al. 2000, 2010 ; Deary, 2001a–c). That is, they are not
independent and they derive much of the variation
from g. Thus, the reason that people are good at do-
mains like verbal, spatial, reasoning, speed and other
cognitive domains is that they are high on g and also
that they have some more speciﬁc capability asso-
ciated with that domain. One should not make the
mistake of thinking that ability on a given domain is
independent of g. This also applies to the speciﬁc skills
too : being good at a very speciﬁc mental ability is
partly to do with that speciﬁc skill, partly to do with
the domain with which it is associated, and also partly
to do with general cognitive ability.
The general cognitive ability factor has several ad-
vantages for genetic studies. It has high stability of
individual diﬀerences across most of the human life
course (Deary et al. 2000). The general factor from dif-
ferent cognitive test batteries ranks people almost
identically (Johnson et al. 2004). The general factor
from a number of cognitive tests can be extracted and
used as a score to indicate people’s level of general
cognitive ability. This can be done using various
multivariate statistical methods, such as principal
components analysis (PCA), and exploratory and
conﬁrmatory factor analysis. Of course, there arises
the question of whether people would be ranked the
same or diﬀerently when the g factor was based on
diﬀerent cognitive test batteries. This has been stud-
ied, and the result is that, when large samples of
people have been tested on diﬀerent cognitive test
batteries, the general cognitive factor (g) derived from
them correlates very highly, often near to 1; that is,
g factors derived from diﬀerent groups of tests rank
people almost identically (Johnson et al. 2004, 2008).
This is useful for genome-wide association studies of
general cognitive ability. It means that, although dif-
ferent studies have used diﬀerent cognitive tests, if
each has used a suﬃcient number of suﬃciently di-
verse cognitive tests, then the g derived from each of
them may be comparable, and used to indicate a
similar trait across studies in meta-analyses. The
structural and functional brain correlates of general
ability diﬀerences are also increasingly well under-
stood (Jung & Haier, 2007 ; Deary et al. 2010). While
there are genetic eﬀects – as shown from behavioural
genetic studies – at the three levels (Rijsdijk et al. 2002;
Deary et al. 2009, 2010), much of the genetic inﬂuence
is on the general mental ability factor. The heritability
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of general cognitive ability is well established, with an
additive genetic contribution that rises from quite low
levels in early childhood to over 60% throughout
adulthood.
In addition to the three-level hierarchical model of
cognitive ability diﬀerences – with a general cognitive
factor at the apex – having much replication in
psychometric studies, it should also be addressed
whether there is validating biological evidence for
such a structure. This has been addressed by a number
of authors, and some key examples are given here.
These are examples where biological eﬀects have been
examined with respect to the hierarchical model of
cognitive diﬀerences. In each case formal hypothesis
testing using structural equation modelling was used
to examine inﬂuences on g and the other cognitive
domains. Thus, for example, the major inﬂuence of age
is on the g level of the hierarchy with some additional
eﬀects on memory and processing speed domains
(Salthouse, 2004). The well-established, modest
correlation between brain size – estimated in healthy
individuals using magnetic resonance brain scan-
ning – is largely captured by the association between
total brain volume and g (MacLullich et al. 2002). Other
g–brain associations are reviewed by Deary et al.
(2010). In addition, behavioural genetic studies show
that the principal genetic inﬂuence on cognitive func-
tions is an additive genetic inﬂuence on g, and that
genetic eﬀects on more speciﬁc domains of cognitive
function largely derive from the genetic inﬂuences
on g (Deary et al. 2009).
In summary, the phenotype of cognitive abilities is
described by a three-level hierarchy that captures
variation in people’s mental functioning at diﬀerent
levels of generality. This framework is a good starting
point for genetic studies, which may be aimed at dif-
ferent levels. The evidence to date shows that much of
the genetic inﬂuence is on general ability, and that like
human height will have a complex genetic architecture
(Lanktree et al. 2011). It makes sense therefore to target
this level of cognition with regard to molecular genetic
studies, including in current genome-wide association
study (GWAS) approaches described later in this
review.
Choosing between speciﬁc cognitive functions and
tasks in cognitive phenomic analysis
Several criteria have been put forward for choosing
appropriate cognitive measures as phenotypes rel-
evant to psychiatric studies (Cannon, 2005 ; Gur et al.
2007 ; Donohoe et al. 2009). The most obvious criterion,
perhaps, is whether and to what extent performance
on a given task is heritable. Diﬀerent classes of
relatives share more or less genetic material (e.g.
monozygotic twins share 100% of genes, dizygotic
twins/siblings 50%, and half-siblings 25%), making it
possible to estimate the proportion of individual dif-
ferences in performance in a population at a given
time that are due to genetic diﬀerences [termed heri-
tability (h2)]. In considering heritability, the degree to
which performance on a particular function or task
shares genetic variance with the underlying risk of the
disease is also a signiﬁcant consideration (Glahn et al.
2012). While availability of twin and population-based
disease registry data has conﬁrmed the importance of
heritability for many psychiatric disorders, includ-
ing autism and the psychoses (Cardno et al. 1999 ;
McGuﬃn et al. 2003), unavailability of twin data for
many speciﬁc cognitive tests has meant that herita-
bility has been inferred from the familiality of speciﬁc
cognitive deﬁcits in healthy relatives of patients.
Where twin data have been available (Goldberg et al.
1990, 1995 and Toulopoulou et al. 2007 for schizo-
phrenia ; Bidwell et al. 2007 for ADHD), evidence for
heritability of cognitive deﬁcits has generally been
noted.
Shared genetic variation between cognitive and
illness phenotypes is a key concept of the ‘en-
dophenotype’ approach. As originally hypothesized,
endophenotypes – measurable components located
along the pathway between genotype and disease,
such as those derived from cognitive and neuro-
psychological measures – were suggested to be phe-
notypically and genetically simpler than the
more complex disease syndrome, hence leading to
more powerful – and successful – genetic analysis
(Gottesman & Gould, 2003). The use of cognitive
phenotypes as neuropsychiatric endophenotypes has
been reviewed extensively (Glahn et al. 2004 ; Goldberg
& Weinberger, 2004 ; Cannon, 2005 ; Meyer-Lindenber
& Weinberger, 2006 ; Gur et al. 2007 ; Walters & Owen,
2007; Donohoe et al. 2009 ; Corvin et al. 2012). Several
questions about the nature and use of cognitive en-
dophenotypes remain. For example, Gottesman’s
original hypothesis that cognitive phenotypes would
represent genetically ‘simpler ’ constructs than ge-
netically complex psychiatric conditions has not
generally been supported – cognitive constructs like
intelligence appear to be themselves, like other human
traits including height and weight, genetically com-
plex (Bilder et al. 2011). Furthermore, whether cogni-
tive functions are mediators or moderators of genetic
eﬀects on illness remains unclear ; psychiatric GWAS
studies to date suggest that while the increased risk
associated with some common variants is also asso-
ciated with variation in cognitive function [e.g. cal-
cium channel, voltage-dependent, l type, alpha 1c
(CACNA1C) ; Zhang et al. 2012] as either a moderator/
mediator of genetic risk or as a pleiotropic eﬀect, other
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common variants appear to aﬀect risk largely inde-
pendently of cognition [e.g. neurogranin (NRGN) in
schizophrenia ; Donohoe et al. 2011]. Finally, although
high genetic overlap between cognitive deﬁcits and
illness has been reported (e.g. overlapping genetic ef-
fects of about 92% between intelligence quotient and
schizophrenia ; Toulopoulou et al. 2007), population-
based studies suggest that the actual overlap may be
much smaller (Fowler et al. 2012). Whether because of
these factors, or for pragmatic reasons such as avail-
ability of much larger diagnostically phenotyped
samples than cognitively phenotyped samples, cogni-
tive phenotype studies in psychiatric illness have
more typically been used for following up psychiatric
GWAS signals than for discovery. Sometimes termed
‘a reverse endophenotyping’ strategy, the approach
here has been to use neuropsychological measures to
characterize the eﬀects of already GWAS-identiﬁed
risk variants on cognition (for a recent review, see
Corvin et al. 2012).
Irrespective of whether cognitive phenotypes are
used for the purposes of genetic discovery or char-
acterization of already identiﬁed risk variants, a fur-
ther criterion for genetic studies of cognitive functions
and associated measures is that they can be quantitat-
ively measured in a reliable manner. That cognitive
phenotypes should have enhanced reliability as com-
pared with that aﬀorded by diagnostic categories is an
important assumption of the intermediate phenotype
approach (Gottesman & Gould, 2003 ; Bearden &
Freimer, 2006). Thus, the inter-rater reliability (the
consistency of scores across raters) and test–retest re-
liability (the consistency of scores over time) of cogni-
tive phenotypes have been widely scrutinized. In
patient studies, the importance of state independence
(that scores are relatively independent of ﬂuctuations
in clinical symptoms) and independence from medi-
cation eﬀects has been a particular focus in this regard,
particularly for schizophrenia. These studies suggest
that while cognitive deﬁcits are somewhat correlated
with clinical symptoms (for example, negative symp-
toms in schizophrenia), the correlation is low (r2<0.3)
and the amount of variance shared by these variables
appears to be small. In factor analysis, cognitive func-
tion (as measured in terms of memory and attention)
often emerges as a separate factor from clinical symp-
toms (Donohoe & Robertson, 2003 ; Good et al. 2004 ;
Donohoe et al. 2006 ; Lipkovich et al. 2009). Fur-
thermore, changes in cognition following trials of
either medication or cognitive remediation are only
weakly associated with changes in clinical presen-
tation (Davidson et al. 2009 ; Wykes et al. 2011). Finally,
data derived from large-scale studies of individuals at
risk for developing psychosis, either by virtue of
prodromal symptomatology (clinical high risk) or
genetic predisposition (genetic high risk), suggest that
neurocognitive impairment is present regardless of
current symptom status and likelihood of later con-
version to psychosis (Seidman et al. 2010). Taken to-
gether, these data indicate that cognitive phenotypes
are, in addition to being heritable, likely to be stable
and generally independent of ﬂuctuations in clinical
symptomatology.
The utility of several cognitive functions as en-
dophenotypes have been extensively investigated, and
to a reasonable extent supported across illness, in-
cluding memory function (both episodic and working
memory), and various aspects of attentional control
and executive function. Evidence of the utility of these
individual cognitive phenotypes and measures in re-
lation to speciﬁc neuropsychiatric disorders has been
reviewed extensively, including Gur et al. (2007) and
Donohoe et al. (2009) for schizophrenia, Glahn et al.
(2004) for bipolar disorder, MacQueen & Frodl (2011)
for major depressive disorder, Bellgrove & Mattingly
(2008) for ADHD, and Abrahams & Geschwind (2010)
for autism. A particular challenge for utilizing these
cognitive constructs in GWAS studies, however, is re-
garding how best to combine test scores between da-
tasets. The requirement for adequately large samples
powered to undertake genome-wide analysis means
that data need to be combined across datasets, usually
from a large number of research groups. However,
because of diﬀerences between groups in the cognitive
measures employed, combining datasets is extremely
challenging. Even where similar cognitive and test
constructs have been employed between sites – e.g.
using the continuous performance test (CPT) to
measure attentional control – diﬀerent versions of the
test (e.g. CPT-AX: Identical Pairs, CPT-IP; Degraded-
Stimulus, CPT-DS) usually result in non-identical
phenotypes between sites.
Univariate versus multivariate analysis
A third consideration for cognitive genetics ap-
proaches is whether to use a multivariate, rather than
univariate, approach. The power of a genetic analysis
(e.g. linkage or GWA) to detect an eﬀect can be greatly
enhanced by collapsing large cognitive batteries into
cognitive domains that can be achieved via factor
analysis. The advantage of factor analysis is threefold:
(1) the maximum amount of cognitive information is
captured by relatively few constructs ; (2) reducing a
large number of variables to smaller number of latent
constructs limits the need for conservative multiple
comparison correction ; and (3) if employing con-
ﬁrmatory factor analysis measurement error can be
accounted for. A potential disadvantage of this ap-
proach is that if the grouped measures do not share
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common genetic aetiology it actually reduces the
power to ﬁnd an eﬀect. Thus the development of factor
models should be guided by the covariance within the
cognitive data and the degree to which that covariance
can be explained by shared genetic eﬀects (current
eﬀorts to address these issues are described by Bilder
et al. 2011).
Given evidence that shared genetic factors inﬂuence
g, cognitive domains and speciﬁc cognitive traits,
searching for genes inﬂuencing g is intrinsically a
multivariate analysis. Such an analysis is designed to
localize loci associated with each level of the three-
level hierarchy. In this context, focusing on g should be
more eﬀective than searching for the genetic inﬂu-
ences of each of the speciﬁc cognitive tests alone, as the
index of g is typically more reliable than individual
test scores and a single phenotype is assessed
(compared with many), reducing the need for correc-
tion for multiple comparisons. However, there is an
alternative view. It is possible that the g construct is
exceptionally polygenetic, with large numbers of
genes of very small eﬀect (Lanktree et al. 2011), making
it very diﬃcult to identify a single genetic target
(gene). In contrast, individual tests may have rela-
tively less complex genetic architectures, aﬀording
them the potential for gene discovery. Eventually
empirical evidence will determine which of these
alternatives is more likely. Unfortunately, support
for either hypothesis is largely missing at this time.
GWAS era and challenges of power
An extensive literature now exists on cognitive studies
of single genes associated with increased illness risk
for neuropsychiatric diseases with childhood onset
(e.g. autism, ADHD), and adult onset (e.g. schizo-
phrenia, bipolar disorder, Alzheimer’s disease). With
few exceptions (e.g. apolipoprotein E), however,
identifying a speciﬁc role in cognition for individual
gene variants across these disorders has been chal-
lenging (Payton, 2009 ; Corvin et al. 2012). In the ma-
jority of cases, individual variants have not been
robustly associated with the illness phenotype, and no
clear functional variants have been identiﬁed, making
direct comparison of studies diﬃcult. These diﬃcult-
ies have been further hampered by the diﬀerences in
the cognitive measures investigated. What is perhaps
most striking about this literature is how closely the
cognitive phenotype ﬁndings recapitulate the illness
phenotype ﬁndings in term of the small proportion of
variation explained (about 1–2%) and the frequent
lack of replication. This, together with evidence of a
signiﬁcant negative correlation between observed
eﬀect and sample size (Rose & Donohoe, 2012),
highlights the necessity of incorporating large samples
in order to optimally detect these expected small
eﬀects.
Recent (and relatively aﬀordable) technological ad-
vances in genotyping platforms have resulted in a
move from single-gene studies towards genome-wide
association studies using platforms that can assay
more than 1 million genomic markers. This GWAS
approach has allowed for a relatively hypothesis-free
scan of the entire human genome, thereby markedly
increasing the genetic information. GWAS platforms
oﬀer optimal coverage of common variation for single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)-based association
analyses and simultaneously capture structural vari-
ation, such as copy-number variation through the use
of intensity data analyses without requiring the im-
plementation of a secondary technology. Imputation,
or prediction, strategies capitalize on what is known
about the correlation among SNPs and provide
meaningful estimates of genomic variation that is not
directly genotyped on GWAS platforms and can fur-
ther improve resolution. These advantages notwith-
standing, GWAS methodology has certain challenges,
especially for cognitive phenomics.
The use of a genome-wide, hypothesis-free strategy
implies the need to handle large quantities of data
while attempting to maintain adequate statistical
power. While the standard in the ﬁeld of research for
statistical signiﬁcance has long been set at a p value
<0.05, the use of hundreds of thousands, or millions,
of statistical tests in GWAS analyses has necessitated
multiple-testing corrections that require conservative
a values : for example, a p value threshold in and
around 5r10x8 derived from a Bonferroni correction
for about 550 000 observations is often used, although
the p value will be smaller for>1 million SNPs. This,
together with the likelihood of individual common
variants explaining only a modest proportion of vari-
ation in cognition, highlights the need for extremely
large sample sizes (Manolio, 2010).
In an eﬀort to surmount this problem, several large-
scale consortia have been organized across numerous
medical and neuropsychiatric disorders, which rep-
resent collaborative eﬀorts to merge independent da-
tasets. In addition to increasing sample sizes, optimal
power can be achieved through the use of information
in the public domain, which can provide for targeted
selection of the smallest number of SNPs required to
tag common variation across the genome through the
use of linkage disequilibrium (LD) data in reference
samples.
There have been several genome-wide association
studies conducted that directly targeted normal hu-
man cognition, each of which highlight the importance
of large sample sizes and replication. The ﬁrst GWAS
study of cognition (Papassotiropoulos et al. 2006)
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focused on episodic memory in 351 young adults from
Switzerland and reported a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
gene, KIBRA (kidney- and brain-expressed protein),
on free recall performance 5 min and 24 h after initial
word presentation. This result was replicated in a se-
cond independent cohort of subjects from the USA.
Subsequent cognitive GWAS studies have also sug-
gested that KIBRA could inﬂuence aspects of cognitive
function ; Need et al. (2009) reported that in a study of
over 1000 subjects recruited from college campuses,
10 genes achieved nominal signiﬁcance for association
with speciﬁc aspects of cognition, including a SNP
(but not the same SNP as originally reported by
Papassotiropoulos et al. 2006) in KIBRA with verbal
learning and memory as assessed with the Cambridge
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery. Other
cognitive GWAS studies (e.g. Seshadri et al. 2007 ;
Butcher et al. 2008) have been unable to observe these
eﬀects, however, though substantive diﬀerences in
both the phenotypic and genotypic assessment strate-
gies hamper the interpretation of these data.
Luciano et al. (2011) describe the results of a colla-
borative meta-analysis of data derived from three co-
horts with a total sample size of 2379 individuals. The
primary outcome measure of this study was focused
on the domain of processing speed, a lower-level
cognitive construct that shares a large proportion of
genetic variance with higher-order processes (Luciano
et al. 2004). The primary results indicated no individ-
ual marker (SNP) that reached genome-wide statistical
signiﬁcance. More recently, we undertook a GWAS of
general intelligence in a sample of 3511 healthy in-
dividuals (Davies et al. 2011). General intelligence in
this study was separated into crystallized intelligence
and ﬂuid intelligence, based on a PCA of the overlap-
ping (but non-identical) measures available in the ﬁve
cohorts. Genome-wide analyses of SNP data in this
study indicated that genetic variants in LD with com-
mon SNPs account for 40–50% of the variation in
general intelligence. We furthermore observed, using
gene-based analysis, a genome-wide signiﬁcant as-
sociation between general ﬂuid-type intelligence
and variation in the formin-binding protein 1-like
(FNBP1L) gene. Taken together, these cognitive GWAS
studies highlight the expectation that small eﬀect sizes
for individual loci will be the norm, reinforce the ad-
vantages of utilization of comparable genotyping
platforms, and emphasize the need for careful con-
sideration of the precise cognitive phenotype for
examination.
COGENT
These initial GWAS studies of normal human cog-
nition represent a step forward in our understanding
of the genetic architecture of cognitive functions.
Moreover, like other complex brain-based pheno-
types, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,
these studies provide strong evidence of polygenic
inﬂuence on cognitive performance. They also high-
light the need for much larger samples of healthy
subjects who have been comprehensively phenotyped.
To this end, we have initiated an international
collaborative eﬀort entitled ‘The Cognitive Genom-
ics Consortium (COGENT)’. The primary goal of
COGENT is to bring together existing databases with
information on normal human cognitive function
(healthy individuals) as well as genetic information in
the form of already completed genotyping conducted
on a genome-wide platform. By combining eﬀorts, we
hope to achieve sample sizes of >8000 subjects and
the resultant statistical power necessary to detect
genetic loci associated with cognition with small ef-
fects. In brief, the consortium currently consists of nine
sites across seven countries and is led by the Zucker
Hillside Hospital – North Shore Long Island Jewish
Health System site in New York, USA. Each site is
contributing existing neurocognitive phenotype data
linked with genotype data from a high-quality gen-
ome-wide platform. Although platforms and pheno-
type measures vary by site, the consortium has formed
several committees to best handle synchronization
and several other practical issues in dealing with the
merging of data.
With data in hand, the ﬁrst phase of analysis will
focus on identifying genetic variation associated with
general cognitive ability (g), as in Davies et al. (2011).
As mentioned in the ﬁrst section of our review there
are several reasons to choose g, including (1) its ability
to account for, and indeed predict, a substantial per-
centage of the variance (about 40–50%) in perform-
ance on domain-speciﬁc cognitive functions (Deary
et al. 2009) ; (2) its well-established and high herita-
bility ; (3) the feasibility of extracting a measure of g
from the wide variety of cognitive tasks collected
across sites using PCA; and (4) its stability and com-
parability across samples even when diﬀerent tasks
are used (Deary et al. 2009). Initial approaches will
utilize meta-analytic techniques to identify common
variants associated with g ; extensive discussions by
the COGENT phenotype committee led to the view
that merging g across sites with diﬀerent ascertain-
ment and subject characteristics would be too prob-
lematic for a mega-analytic approach. Several key
decisions have been made in an eﬀort to make the
calculation of g uniform across sites including : (1) a
minimum of three tests will be needed to calculate a
valid g ; (2) only one (best representative) variable per
neurocognitive task will be included in the calculation
of g ; (3) missing data will be addressed on a
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site-by-site basis, as it is largely dependent on the total
number of variables used to calculate g and the total
number of missing values per subject ; and (4) age and
sex will be controlled for a priori using regression.
Follow-up analyses, dependent on initial results, may
entail pathway-based approaches, additional sequen-
cing plans, and prospective data collection ; a mega-
analysis of individual measures for which signiﬁcant
overlap across sites is available is also intended as a
second-phase analysis. Finally, we also anticipate that
COGENT will grow large enough to serve as a data-
base which will allow future questions related to re-
lationships between speciﬁc neuropsychiatric disorder
susceptibility genes and cognitive phenotypes to be
explored. Much larger samples will be required for
investigation of rare variation; however, dependent
on the ﬁnal sample size, this may become a viable
option in the future.
Conclusion
Cognitive genomics is a rapidly changing ﬁeld due to
the pace of technological advances in this area.
Advances in our understanding of the genetic archi-
tecture of cognition has derived in no small part from
the use of cognition as an intermediate phenotype
relevant to understanding how risk for psychiatric
illness is conferred at the level of brain function.
Research groups working in schizophrenia, autism
and ADHD, as well as in intellectual disability and
other childhood neurodevelopmental disorders have
amassed considerable experience in characterizing the
eﬀects of ‘candidate ’ genes at the level of cognition.
As with illness consortia involving the collaboration of
dozens if not hundreds of researchers to achieve the
sample size required for adequately powered genome-
wide studies, cognitive genomic researchers have also
engaged in large-scale collaborations. As reviewed
here, doing so requires careful calibration not just of
genetic platforms and analysis, but also of cognitive
phenotypes across samples. This involves under-
standing and modelling the hierarchical relationship
between diﬀerent domains of cognition and the re-
sultant correlation between individual tests. It in-
volves selecting measures of cognitive domains that
have already demonstrated heritability. In the case of
multiple tests, and non-identity between these tests,
factor analysis has been discussed as a method for re-
ducing the burden of multiple testing and extracting
an index of function across non-identical tests used by
diﬀerent research sites. Use of Spearman’s g has been
described as one example of this approach in the ﬁeld.
Extending this approach to other cognitive pheno-
types that have already been associated with genetic
variation (e.g. indices of memory and working
memory) is also likely to be of value. Finally, this re-
view highlights the close interplay between the ﬁelds
of cognitive and psychiatric genetics and the relevance
for discoveries that each may have to the other.
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